

Page Denied

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied



Washington, D.C. 20505

14 September 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director, Office of East Asian Analysis

FROM: [REDACTED]

Chief, South Asia Division, NESA

25X1

SUBJECT:

Briefing papers for Secretary of Defense's trip
to Pakistan. [REDACTED]

25X1


Attached are several short items that we drafted in support
of the Secretary of Defense's trip to Pakistan. Ron Zwart of
DoD/ISA and [REDACTED] of NESA have already coordinated on the
substance and format of the papers. [REDACTED]

25X1

25X1

Attachments as stated

25X1




25X1

NESA M 83-10228CX

25X1



25X1



[Redacted]

25X1

SUBJECT: Briefing Papers for Secretary of Defense's trip to
Pakistan [Redacted]

25X1

Distribution:

Orig - Addressee
1 - D/NESA
1 - DD/NESA
1 - NIO/NESA
1 - C/PES
4 - CPAS/IMD/CB
2 - NESA/PS
1 - C/SO/NESA
4 - C/PAB/SO/NESA
1 - Chrono

DDI/NESA/SO/P [Redacted]

(14 Sept 83)

25X1

[Redacted]

-2-[Redacted]

[Redacted]

25X1

25X1

Page Denied

Next 4 Page(s) In Document Denied

Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

14 September 1983

Afghanistan: Status and Prospects of the Insurgency

Three and a half years after the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, the resistance has become an effective force that controls much of the country [redacted]

25X1

Barring a drastic change in Soviet policy, we judge the fighting will continue over the next few years because existing Soviet forces will be unable to destroy the resistance. Despite improvements in weapons and training, however, we believe the insurgents will lack the firepower and organization to defeat major Soviet units. [redacted]

25X1

25X1



Soviet costs in the war have been considerable, according to our estimates [redacted]


25X1

-- We estimate that over 16,000 Soviets have been killed or wounded in Afghanistan. The Afghan Army has suffered 50,000 casualties and nearly 80,000 men have deserted.

This memorandum was prepared by the South Asia Division, Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis, in preparation for the Secretary of Defense's trip to Pakistan. Information as of September 12, 1983 was used in preparation of this paper. Comments and queries are welcome and should be addressed to Chief, South Asia Division [redacted]

25X1

25X1



25X1

Nevertheless, we judge the Soviets still find the costs bearable and apparently believe that their relations with many countries are recovering from the damage done by the invasion and that in the long run they will overcome the resistance. We believe there is no immediate prospect that the Soviets will decide to reduce their military effort in Afghanistan.

25X1

We judge that the resistance fighters will become more politically sophisticated and militarily effective in the next two years, but they will remain vulnerable.

- The most serious threat to the resistance is civilian war-weariness and the loss of popular support over the long term that would directly affect the will to continue fighting.
- Cooperation among insurgent bands has grown, but because of deep ideological, political, and religious differences, we do not foresee a united resistance movement emerging in the next few years.
- The Soviets and the Kabul regime are likely, in our view, to continue and probably increase a wide variety of covert and overt activities [redacted] to exploit [redacted] insurgent weaknesses inside and outside of Afghanistan.

25X1

25X1

25X1

There are some Soviet options--massive troop reinforcement or a widespread scorched earth policy against civilians--that might drastically reduce the insurgency in the next two years.

- Moscow would, however, be reluctant to assume the high economic, political, and military costs associated with these options, in our judgment.

25X1

The Soviets have started a number of economic, educational, social, and political programs in Afghanistan that they believe will eventually turn the country into a viable Soviet-dominated communist state [redacted]. Because of widespread insurgent activity and opposition from the Afghan people, however, these programs have been implemented in only a few areas.

25X1

25X1

25X1

Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, D.C. 20505

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

14 September 1983

Pakistan: Steadfastness on Afghanistan

Pakistani leaders view the Soviet presence in Afghanistan as a strategic threat. They believe [redacted] the Soviets want to gain permanent overland access to the Persian Gulf and the Indian Ocean littoral. They are worried that Moscow will increase its political and military pressure on Pakistan once it has consolidated its hold on Afghanistan. [redacted]

25X1

[redacted] they are concerned that Moscow will collaborate with India to neutralize and divide Pakistan--perhaps by a combination of external military pressure and subversive meddling in Pakistan's unstable domestic politics. [redacted]

25X1

25X1

We believe Pakistan continues to engage the Soviets in periodic talks on Afghanistan for a number of reasons:

- The UN-sponsored talks provide Pakistan both with a way to test Soviet intentions in Afghanistan and maintain international support for its position on Afghanistan.
- Pakistan keeps its channels open to Moscow because it worries that the West will in time forget about Afghanistan or reach an agreement over Pakistan's head as part of a larger East-West settlement.
- The refugee problem inside Pakistan has become a major concern to Islamabad. Rising local resentments and concern in the Army that some 3 million Afghan refugees will become a permanent burden for Pakistan have added a note of urgency to Pakistan's search for a political settlement. So far, however, relations between the Afghan refugees and locals--who belong to the same ethnic group--have been peaceful. [redacted]

25X1

This memorandum was prepared by the South Asia Division, Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis, in preparation for the Secretary of Defense's trip to Pakistan. Information as of September 12, 1983 was used in preparation of this paper. Comments and queries are welcome and should be addressed to Chief, South Asia Division [redacted]

25X1

SECRET

SECRET

We doubt Islamabad is ready to shift its stand on the issue in ways that would damage US interests. So far in the indirect talks at Geneva, Pakistan has remained steadfast in its insistence that a political settlement is contingent on a withdrawal of Soviet troops. According to [redacted] statements by senior Pakistani officials:

25X1

- Islamabad supports the Afghan insurgents in order to make it more difficult for the Soviets to consolidate their hold on Afghanistan. An active insurgency is crucial to Pakistan's diplomatic campaign to keep Afghanistan before world opinion as an issue that can be settled only by the withdrawal of Soviet troops.
- A political settlement acceptable to the Zia regime would have to permit the voluntary return to Afghanistan of the Afghan refugees in Pakistan. Islamabad knows the refugees will not return home unless the Soviets first withdraw their troops.
- Pakistan has consistently refused to recognize the Babrak regime. Islamabad knows that recognition is its trump card. It is doubtful that it would play it until a pull-out of Soviet troops is largely completed and most of the refugees have returned home.
- Pakistan's current policy on Afghanistan receives strong support from conservative religious parties at home and vital friends abroad, such as Saudi Arabia, China, and the US. Pakistan's strong stand on Afghanistan and its support for an active insurgency enables it to argue more effectively with the Saudis, the US, and China that it needs and deserves enhanced diplomatic, economic, and military support. [redacted]

25X1

SECRET

Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, D.C. 20505

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

14 September 1983

Pakistan: Implications of Military Commitments to Arab States

Pakistan's approximately 18,000 military personnel stationed in the Middle East and North Africa are becoming an important vehicle for achievement of Islamabad's foreign policy goals. Pakistan has reaped significant benefits from the program, according to our analysis:

- Salary remittances have provided an economic boost.
- Islamabad has acquired new sources of arms procurement.
- Pakistan has become one of the largest non-Arab recipients of financial support from the oil-rich Arab states.
- Pakistan's military personnel have gained valuable training on advanced Western and Soviet military equipment--including Soviet aircraft--which has given them a better understanding of the capabilities of the Indian Air Force.

25X1

We believe the military assistance, however, also carries risks:

- The longer the Pakistani troops stay abroad, the greater the risk that Pakistan will become embroiled in local or regional conflicts to which it is not a party.
- Pakistan's international image is tarnished by charges that it provides "soldiers for hire" to radical regimes such as Libya.

-- [redacted] morale within the armed forces could be damaged by the disparity between overseas and domestic salaries and by discrimination against Pakistani Shia personnel by the recipient countries.

25X1

25X1

This memorandum was prepared by the South Asia Division, Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis, in preparation for the Secretary of Defense's trip to Pakistan. Information as of September 12, 1983 was used in preparation of this paper. Comments and queries are welcome and should be addressed to Chief, South Asia Division [redacted]

25X1

SECRET

SECRET

We judge Pakistan will continue and may even expand its military ties with the Middle East in order to ensure Arab political support and economic assistance. In our view, as long as Pakistani personnel demonstrate competence and Pakistan maintains a stable and moderate government with Islamic credentials, there will be a market for its military personnel in the Middle East and North Africa. We believe that concern over external and internal threats to stability brought on by the strife in Lebanon, the continuing Iran/Iraq conflict, and Iran's Shia religious fanaticism might well prompt the Gulf states to request even larger foreign military contingents. [redacted]

25X1

Our analysis suggests, however, that several factors could slow an expansion of military ties or lead to a reduction in requests for military assistance:

- The limited capacity of the recipient countries to absorb more military personnel.
- Competition from other states to supply military advisers.
- The risk that Pakistan could be drawn into regional conflicts.
- The limited number of skilled technical personnel in Pakistan. [redacted]

25X1

The United States generally benefits from Pakistan's military assistance program. Cooperation between Islamabad and the Arab States strengthens the military establishments of moderate governments while dampening Pakistan's financial demands on the United States and minimizing the US visibility in this sensitive region. Only in the training of Libyan pilots and small numbers of Palestinian guerrillas do Pakistan's military ties run counter to US interests. We assess that a setback to the military assistance program, accompanied by a reduction in Arab economic assistance to Pakistan, would increase political and economic strains in Pakistan and increase Islamabad's requests for US economic and military aid. [redacted]

25X1

SECRET

Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

14 September 1983

Pakistan-China-US: Arms Technology Transfer

We believe Pakistan will probably safeguard the new US arms it receives to protect the arms supply relationship unless major strains develop in relations with the United States. Pakistan still considers its relations with China more durable than those with the United States and in the past has given Beijing access to western arms technologies. Nonetheless, Pakistan regards advanced US weapons as the key to its military modernization and wants to continue the security assistance program,

25X1
25X1

-- Islamabad is aware of US concern about unauthorized transfers of US weapons to China and has signed a General Security of Military Information Agreement with the United States.

-- The resolution last winter of the ALR-69 radar warning receiver issue to Zia's satisfaction and the delivery of the first F-16s has strengthened Islamabad's faith in the US security relationship.

25X1
25X1

Pakistan has close military ties with China that include a past history of transferring French arms technology and agreements with Beijing on joint weapons development and technology exchange.

25X1

-- During his visit to Beijing in November 1982, President Zia signed an agreement that contained provisions for Chinese-Pakistani cooperation in weapons development and production.

25X1

This memorandum was prepared by the South Asia Division, Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis, in preparation for the Secretary of Defense's trip to Pakistan. Information as of September 12, 1983 was used in preparation of this paper. Comments and queries are welcome and should be addressed to Chief, South Asia Division

25X1

25X1

25X1

We believe Pakistan will protect US arms technology as long as the US security relationship is perceived in Islamabad as providing tangible benefits. Major strains in relations with the United States over the nuclear issue or new disputes on arms agreements could undermine Islamabad's confidence in the United States and threaten the security relationship, possibly causing Pakistan to share US weapons or technology with China. Even if US-Pakistani relations remain strong, however, there is a risk that China at some point will gain access to Pakistan's US arms, given the intimacy of Pakistan's ties to China.

25X1

TOP SECRET

SECRET
Central Intelligence Agency

Washington, D.C. 20505

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

14 September 1983

Pakistan: Prospects for President Zia

President Zia ul-Haq is coping successfully with the current disturbances in Pakistan--the most serious threat to his rule so far. We believe his regime's capable handling of serious anti-government rioting in Sind Province coupled with the unwillingness of Pakistanis in other provinces to join the protest movement increase the chances that Zia and the Army will continue to guide Pakistan's political future for at least the next one to two years.

-- Zia's authoritarian regime has avoided overly repressive policies, though it has dealt firmly with organized demonstrations. It has given the country more than six years of domestic stability and substantial economic progress.

-- Zia also has dealt effectively with external threats. He has stood up to the Soviets on Afghanistan, while keeping channels open to a negotiated settlement; he has improved relations with India; and he has succeeded in gaining major economic aid and arms assistance from the United States. [redacted]

25X1

The President ultimately depends on the Army to remain in power. Most senior officers support Zia's plan for a phased return to civilian government and a permanent oversight role for the armed forces [redacted]

25X1

-- No ruler, however, can be certain of the Army's support if it is called upon to put down civil disorders, particularly in the all-important province of Punjab. [redacted]

Zia's main opposition, the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD), a coalition of eight opposition parties, is [redacted]

25X1

This memorandum was prepared by the South Asia Division, Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis, in preparation for the Secretary of Defense's trip to Pakistan. Information as of September 12, 1983 was used in preparation of this paper. Comments and queries are welcome and should be addressed to Chief, South Asia Division [redacted]

25X1

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

poorly organized and so far has lacked both a popular issue or an effective leader to galvanize a nationwide anti-Zia campaign.

25X1

- The protest movement in Sind Province this summer was launched largely by the Pakistan People's Party of former Prime Minister Bhutto. The PPP has strong support in Sind, Bhutto's home province, and succeeded in rousing violent protests by playing on local grievances against the Punjabi-dominated government and Army.
- The PPP has substantial support among the urban and rural poor of Punjab, but has found it difficult to mobilize this support in the absence of a strong leader. Most of the PPP faithful look to Bhutto's daughter Benazir, but she has been kept under house arrest for the past two and one-half years.

25X1

President Zia has promised to hold provincial and national elections by March 1985, amend the Constitution to create a strong presidential system, and withdraw martial law. His statements suggest he will bar hostile opposition parties--including the PPP--from participating in the elections. These parties and some influential interest groups believe they are losing ground under Zia and could coalesce against him.

25X1

Given the right circumstances, we believe a nationwide opposition movement could arise rapidly and with little warning. In such an event, the Army probably would replace Zia with another general who would negotiate a return to civilian rule on terms the Army could accept.

- In our view, the Army would attempt to preserve the present US-Pakistan relationship, but if a Pakistan People's Party government succeeded in taking over, US-Pakistan ties, as well as Pakistan's stand on Afghanistan, probably would be significantly weakened.

25X1

SECRET

Central Intelligence Agency



Washington, D.C. 20505

DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

14 September 1983

Pakistan: Perceptions of Relations with the US

US-Pakistani relations have improved since 1980, but these gains are fragile. The two nations' Afghanistan policies and caution regarding Soviet aims in South Asia are convergent interests. However, [redacted] US arms embargoes in 1965 and 1971 plus the temporary suspension of economic aid in 1979 have convinced most Pakistanis that Washington is an unreliable ally. [redacted]

[redacted] Pakistani officials in general are receptive to expanding contacts with the US.

-- Few Pakistani officials believe, however, that the US would support Pakistan if it were attacked by India, and there are doubts about US willingness--and capability--to come to Pakistan's assistance in the event of a Soviet attack. [redacted] some army officers believe Zia has placed too much trust in Washington and believe that the US may again abandon Pakistan after the Afghanistan conflict is resolved.

-- According to Pakistani officials, the sale of advanced weapons is the yardstick by which Islamabad measures US support. The F-16s are especially welcome and are a crucial symbol of the US commitment to Pakistan. [redacted]

Popular perceptions of the US are more ambiguous [redacted]

-- US military and economic assistance is widely publicized and appears to have made a positive impact. However, most Pakistanis reject US Middle East policy, which they charge

This memorandum was prepared by the South Asia Division, Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis, in preparation for the Secretary of Defense's trip to Pakistan. Information as of September 12, 1983 was used in preparation of this paper. Comments and queries are welcome and should be addressed to Chief, South Asia Division [redacted]

25X1

SECRET

SECRET

25X1

[redacted]

is biased in favor of Israel. Many are suspicious that the US remains hostile to Tehran because it cannot tolerate a "truly Islamic government" and believe Pakistan would be subject to similar pressure should it follow Iran's example.

-- Many Pakistanis, including those with ties to the military and the bureaucratic elite, condemn US policy on nuclear nonproliferation as applied to Pakistan. They assert it is intended to prevent the development of domestic nuclear power facilities and to retard Pakistan's ability to achieve economic independence. They reject as hypocritical US claims it is attempting to stop the spread of nuclear weapons and point to Washington's willingness to continue assistance to India, which has exploded a nuclear device.

-- Zia's political opponents are attempting to exploit US military and economic assistance to portray the President 25X1 as a US puppet. Politicians on the left and center repeatedly assert that Zia could not survive without US support. Scattered anti-American incidents occurred during recent anti-regime demonstrations in Sind Province. [redacted]

25X1

SECRET

Page Denied

Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied